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I. INTRODUCTION
The limited liability company ("LLC") business form combines the
advantages of a corporation's limited liability1 with the benefits of a
partnership's flow-through of income to its members.2 Although Wy-
oming passed the first LLC Act in 1977,3 relatively few other state
legislatures thus far have adopted this concept as a possible alterna-
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** J.D., Southern Methodist University School of Law.
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1. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-107 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.436
(West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7620 (Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV. STAT.
§ 86.371 (Michie 1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-109 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (Michie Supp.
1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977).
2. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") uses the following characteristics to de-
termine whether to tax an unincorporated organization as a corporation or as another
type of organization such as a partnership or a trust: (1) associates; (2) an objective to
carry on business and divide gains; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralization of manage-
ment; (5) limited liability; and (6) free transferability of interest. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983). If the organization has more corporate charac-
teristics than noncorporate characteristics, not considering those common to both enti-
ties, the IRS will tax such unincorporated organization as a corporation. Id. at
§ 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983) (associates and objective to carry on business
and divide gains not considered because they are common characteristics of both corpo-
rations and partnerships).
Under the Wyoming statute, the IRS classified the LLC interest as a partnership for
federal income tax purposes because the LLC lacked a preponderance of the corporate
characteristics not common to both. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (LLC lacked con-
tinuity of life and free transferability of interests). Although the LLC state statutes
differ in some significant respects, the overall provisions are relatively consistent, and,
therefore, it may well be that in general the IRS will allow LLCs to enjoy the flow-
through tax benefits of a partnership.
3. WYO. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977).
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tive for business.4 Because the concept is fairly new, no federal or
state court has analyzed whether LLC interests are securities under
the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or
any of the state blue sky securities law provisions.
While a few commentaries have addressed the LLC enterprise in
general, 5 very few make mention of whether interests issued pursu-
ant to this business form constitute securities.6 This article generally
responds to Professor Sargent's position that interests in a LLC are
normally not securities. 7 We take the position that LLC interests
usually satisfy the requirements for securities law status and, hence,
such instruments normally are within the purview of the federal se-
curities and the state blue sky laws.
First, this article analyzes an interest in a LLC as an "investment
contract," utilizing the four-part test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in SEC v. Howey 8 as well as the Court's rationale in
Marine Bank v. Weaver.9 Second, we explore LLC interests under
the same or similar circumstances test adhered to by the United
States Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,o focus-
ing on whether LLC interests have the characteristics of stock. Fi-
nally, pursuant to the definition of a security under the federal
securities acts, we examine a LLC interest as an "interest or instru-
4. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -913 (West Supp. 1991); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-471 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7650
(Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV. STAT. §§ 86-011-.571 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, 1.01-9.02 (Vernon Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -156 (Supp.
1991); VA. CODE A'NN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1069 (Michie Supp. 1991); WyO. STAT. §§ 17-15-
101 to -135 (1977). Note, however, that many other states are now considering whether
to enact LLC legislation. See 55 Tax Notes 1019, 1021 (May 25, 1992).
5. For an overview and comparison of various state LLC statutes, see Brian
Farmer & Louis A. Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 789 (1991); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possi-
ble Choice for Doing Business, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989); Robert R. Keatinge, et al.,
The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375
(1992); John R. Maxfield, et al., Colorado Enacts Limited Liability Company Legisla-
tion, 19 COL. LAW. 1029 (1990); Curtis J. Braukmann, Comment, Limited Liability
Companies, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 967 (1991); Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool,
Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the S
Corporation and the Limited Partnership, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523 (1988).
6. Contrast Farmer & Mezzullo, supra note 5, at 828-29 (analogizing the LLC to a
general or limited partnership and suggesting that the courts will find that an LLC
interest is a security if it satisfies the definition of an "investment contract") with
Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 1069 (1992) (stating that a LLC interest normally does not satisfy the definition
of a security).
7. Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities? 19
PEPP. L. REV. 1069 (1992).
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
10. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
1106
[Vol. 19: 1105, 1992] Limited Liability Company as a Security
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ment commonly known as a security" to show that a common eq-
uity participant in an enterprise called a "company" (as in a Limited
Liability Company) may reasonably expect the investment to have
securities law coverage.
II. LLC INTERESTS AS INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
In SEC v. Howey,12 the United States Supreme Court set forth the
standard test for determining whether an instrument is an invest-
ment contract, and, thus, satisfies the definition of a security.' 3
Howey involved the sale of citrus grove units and optional service
contracts to investors who received profits from the harvest. The
Court found that this arrangement constituted an investment con-
tract, stating, "[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securi-
ties Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is lead to expect prof-
its solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."14 The
following discussion analyzes the four components of the Howey test
in order to illustrate that, in general, an interest in a LLC satisfies
each characteristic, focusing especially on the "solely from the efforts
of others" element.
A. Investment of Money
An investor must surrender some "tangible and definite considera-
tion" in order to satisfy the investment of money element.15 The
Court has noted that in every decision in which it found a security to
be present, the investor had received a separate financial interest for
his or her relinquishment of the consideration.16 This consideration
usually takes the form of cash, but the Court noted that goods and
services also may be sufficient consideration.17
Nonetheless, two LLC statutes exclude services as a valid form of
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988); Se-
curities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
13. Id at 298-99.
14. Id. Howey and other Supreme Court decisions are addressed in MARC I. STEIN-
BERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 4A.01 et. seq. (1991).
15. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979).
16. Id at 560 (stating that "the purchaser gave up some tangible and definable
consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the characteristics of a
security").
17. Id. at 560 n.12.
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contribution to a LLC.18 An investment in a LLC, however, nor-
mally satisfies the first element of the Howey test in spite of this lim-
ited exception, since interest holders usually contribute monetary
amounts. 19
B. Common Enterprise
To date, the United States Supreme Court has declined to clarify
the disagreement among the lower federal courts concerning the
proper test to apply for the common enterprise analysis.20 Irrespec-
tive of the standard employed, LLC interests normally will satisfy
each circuit's requirements.2 1 First, horizontal commonality, the
shared common goal between investors,22 satisfies the common enter-
prise element in all circuits. 23 Normally, interests in a LLC should
meet the horizontal commonality test, since the contributors share a
18. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4211 (West Supp. 1992); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-115
(1977).
19. Moreover, other investors may periodically contribute certain goods or sup-
plies in return for an interest in the LLC. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-501 (West
Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7602(i) (Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV. STAT. § 86.041
(1991); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-124 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Michie Supp. 1991).
20. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115-17 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for certiorari).
21. Some circuits remain undecided on which standard to adopt. For example, the
United States appellate courts for the First, Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have
not made a final determination on which test applies. District courts within these cir-
cuits even disagree on the proper standard. In the Fourth Circuit, compare Burton v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 360, 361-62 (E.D. Va. 1986) (horizontal com-
monality required) with Shotto v. Laub, 635 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D. Md. 1986) (vertical
commonality alone suffices). Furthermore, even judges within the same district disa-
gree on the proper standard. In the Second Circuit, compare Savino v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1238 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (vertical commonality alone suffices)
with Darrell v. Goodson, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,349,
at 97,325 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (horizontal commonality required). Irrespective of the stan-
dard adopted, LLC interests normally satisfy the common enterprise component of the
Howey test.
22. See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 250 (1989):
Generally, horizontal commonality looks to the relationships which exist be-
tween an individual investor and the pool of other investors. A pooling of the
interests of the investors is essential to finding the presence of horizontal
commonality; all courts have held that horizontal commonality is sufficient to
meet the common enterprise requirement of the Howey test.
23. All courts accept horizontal commonality as sufficient to support the common
enterprise element. Some courts, however, still require a showing of horizontal com-
monality, and not vertical commonality alone, to satisfy the common enterprise test.
See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3rd Cir.
1982); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221-22 (6th
Cir. 1980); Minarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); see also Popham, Haik, Schnobrick, Kaufman & Doty, Ltd. v.
Newcomb Secs. Co., 751 F.2d 1262, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (may be read as impliedly ap-
proving the horizontal commonality test adopted in Meredith v. Conticommodity
Servs., Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,701, at 98,670-71
(D.D.C. 1980)).
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common interest in the success and profitability of the LLC. An ex-
ception to this general principle exists if the enterprise only has one
investor. Seven of the eight LLC statutes require two or more mem-
bers to form a LLC.24 If the two members are an investor and a
promotor, however, the LLC may not satisfy the horizontal common-
ality test.25 Such a situation would arise on a relatively infrequent
basis.
Some circuits state that while horizontal commonality always satis-
fies the common enterprise element, vertical commonality, the inter-
weaving of the promotor's and the investor's interests, also may
satisfy the common enterprise definition.26 In the typical business
organization, the promoters and the investors will share a common
goal in the LLC. Only in a rare instance would a promotor have a
different goal from those of the investors in a LLC, which is organ-
ized for a specified business purpose.
C. Expectation of Profits
Under the Howey standard, an investor's expectation of profits
generally consists of either capital appreciation or an investor's par-
ticipation in the earnings which result from the managerial use of
24. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(7) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.405 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7605 (Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV.
STAT. § 86.151 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-103 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1002 (Michie Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-106 (1977). The Texas statute does not
explicitly address the number of members needed to form an LLC. However, it ap-
pears that one person may hold an interest in an LLC, since any natural person can
act as the organizer of an LLC, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 3.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1992), and the managers of the LLC may consist of one or more persons, Id. at
art. 1528n, 2.13.
25. In such a situation, there may not be present the requisite pooling of investor
interests. See authorities cited supra notes 21-23.
26. McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925-26 (10th Cir.
1985); Villeneuve v. Advance Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir.
1983); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 821
(1973). Some courts and commentators distinguish the vertical commonality test even
further by contrasting a narrow view, requiring a commonality of interest between the
promotor and the success of the investment, with a liberal interpretation, requiring the
investor to rely on the promotor for the success of the investment. See Mordaunt v.
Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115-17 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of petition for
certiorari); II LOUIS LOss AND JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 927-935 (3d ed.
1989); James D. Gordon III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contrac-
tual Theory for Defining Investment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
635; Sargent, supra note 7, at 1082 n. 84; Nathan W. Drage, Comment, Are Limited
Partnership Interests Securities? A Different Conclusion Under the California Lim-
ited Partnership Act, 18 PAC. L.J. 125 (1986).
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the investor's funds.27 Moreover, a number of courts suggest that an
investor can satisfy the expectation of profits element even if the in-
vestor's principal purpose is to obtain tax benefits.28 In most in-
stances, an investor will contribute his or her money with the
expectation of some sort of profitable return in the LLC.
D. Solely from the Efforts of Others
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has asserted that, in de-
fining the term "security," "form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality." 29 Consistent with
this principle, the lower federal courts have not literally construed
the phrase that profits be derived solely from the efforts of others.30
Rather, even though there is input from the investors, this require-
ment is deemed satisfied if the efforts made by others "are the unde-
niably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise."31  Although the
Supreme Court has yet to embrace the foregoing standard, it has re-
stated the Howey test in a more flexible manner. 32
Applying the economic reality test, the lower federal courts gener-
ally have held limited partnership interests to be securities.33 This
27. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 321 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, (5th Cir. 1989) (implying that
obtaining tax benefits without receiving profits may satisfy the expectation of profits
definition); Kolibash v. Sagittarius Recording Co., 626 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (S.D. Ohio
1986); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D. Fla.), affd
on other grounds, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1980); Investors Credit Corp. v. Extended War-
ranties, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,343 at 92,258 (M.D.
Tenn. Jan. 28, 1989); but see United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 321 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)
(implying that tax benefits alone are not sufficient, but arguably stating the rationale
for such failure is because they do not result from the managerial efforts of others, not
because they do not necessarily constitute profits); Gurdy v. Bank of La Place, No. 90-
3428, 1992 WL 20083 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 1992) (implying that tax benefits alone may not
satisfy the expectation of profit element because the term "carries with it a connota-
tion of potential appreciation or depreciation in the value of the investment contract").
29. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S.Ct. 945, 949 (1990); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1967).
30. See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Professional Assocs. 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin
v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); SEC v.
Aqua-Sonic Prod. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982);
Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc.,
669 F.2d 770, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCullouch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d
1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th
Cir. 1976); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 821
(1973).
32. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 ("The touchstone is the pres-
ence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.").
33. As the Fifth Circuit has stated: "There is no disagreement ... that, generally,
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conclusion largely has been supported by such factors as the limited
partners' inability to dissolve the partnership, their lack of power to
bind other partners, and their lack of authority to take an active role
in the partnership's management. 34 In those situations, however,
where limited partners exert meaningful control over the partner-
ship, courts have held that such interests are not securities.3 5
On the other hand, general partnership interests usually are not
securities due to the fact that the individual participants exercise a
meaningful level of managerial control.36 A number of primarily
older cases opine that general partners have ultimate control and
hence are not dependent upon the efforts of others, even if such au-
thority is not actually exercised or is delegated to a managerial com-
mittee.3 7 This approach neglects economic reality and is not the
prevailing view.38 Admittedly, under this view, LLC interests nor-
mally would not be securities since most of the state statutes vest
management power in the LLC members.39 This ability to control
the direction of the entity looks similar to the general partnership
structure. Utilizing the foregoing approach, the power vested to LLC
participants by statute normally should defeat claims that such par-
ticipants did not have the power to control their investments.
In Williamson v. Tucker,40 however, the Fifth Circuit, applying
investment contracts include limited partnership interests." L&B Hospital Ventures,
Inc. v. Healthcare Int'l, Inc., 894 F.2d 150, 151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 55
(1990). See Sibel . Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1984); Mayer v. Oil Field Systems
Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1983); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir.
1980); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-08 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
939 (1979).
34. See, e.g., Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986).
35. See, e.g., Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982); Bank of American Na-
tional Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse, 595 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Darrah v. Garrett,
[1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,472 (W.D. Ohio 1984). See gener-
ally Loss and Seligman, supra note 26, at 961-63; Sargent, supra note 7, at 1084-87.
36. See, e.g., Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 346-47.
37. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1984) (Garth J.,
separate opinion); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553
F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313, 314-15 (N.D.
Utah 1968).
38. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
39. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-8-401 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422
(West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV. STAT.
§ 86.291 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1002(A) (Michie Supp. 1991); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-166 (1977). Note that the LLC operat-
ing documents, like a limited or general partnership agreement, may allocate power so
that only the promoters exert significant managerial efforts.
40. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the economic reality test,4' recognized that in certain circumstances
general partnership interests may be considered securities. 42 The
Williamson court described the following three situations where a
general partnership interest can be designated a security: First,
where the partnership agreement allocates so little power in the
hands of the subject partner that the arrangement distributes power
similar to that of a limited partnership; second, where a partner's in-
experience or lack of knowledge renders such partner incapable of
exercising his or her partnership powers in a meaningful way; and
third, where a partner depends on the manager's unique en-
trepreneurial or managerial abilities to such a degree that replacing
such person is not a feasible alternative.43 Nonetheless, as William-
son made clear, a general partner who seeks securities law coverage
bears a heavy burden of proof.44
Williamson's economic reality approach to general partnership in-
terests represents the emerging and apparent majority view.45 Pro-
vided that investors purchasing LLC interests can prove that one of
the Williamson factors applies to their situation, they may sustain
their claims that the investments come within the securities laws.
Because the LLC business form is relatively new, it is still unsettled
how much management power each member will possess in the en-
tity. This is important because, due to the provisions contained in the
LLC operating documents (such as the written agreement among the
members) or the expertise required to actually operate the business,
investors may rely heavily on the promotor's skills. Such lack of con-
trol may deem the investor incapable or inexperienced to meaning-
fully exercise his or her partnership powers in the enterprise, thus
satisfying the Williamson test. Such a determination, however, must
be made on an ad hoc basis, looking to the provisions of the pertinent
LLC documents as well as balancing the knowledge and experience
of the individual investor against the power and control of the LLC
management framework.
The Texas LLC statute makes the opposite presumption from the
41. Id. at 418. See cases cited supra note 29.
42. 645 F.2d at 420 ("[T]he mere fact that an investment takes the form of a gen-
eral partnership or joint venture does not inevitably insulate it from the reach of the
federal securities laws.").
43. Id. at 422. In an accompanying footnote the court pointed out that by listing
the three factors, "this is not to say that other factors could not also give rise to such a
dependence on the promoter or manager that the exercise of partnership powers
would be effectively precluded." Id. at 422 n.15.
44. Id. at 424. See Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986).
45. See Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1476-81 (9th Cir. 1991); Banghart v.
Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1990); Rivanna Trawlers
Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 1988); Odom v. Sla-
vik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 840 (11th Cir.
1982).
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other LLC statutes, stating that the powers of the LLC are vested in
the managers of the entity, and that the managers need not partici-
pate as LLC members.46 This structure closely resembles a limited
partnership, which generally constitutes a security because limited
partners normally rely on the general partners to control the entity's
activities.47 Nonetheless, as in a limited partnership, a determination
must be made on an ad hoc basis whether the members in a particu-
lar Texas LLC had managerial control over the investment which
would preclude them from invoking Howey's "solely from the efforts
of others" element.48
E. Effect of Marine Bank v. Weaver
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,49 the Supreme Court held that a
profit-sharing agreement entered into by two parties was not an in-
vestment contract.50 Without applying the Howey test, the Court
pointed to such factors as the unique nature of the agreement, that it
was privately negotiated one-on-one, that no prospectus had been dis-
seminated to prospective investors, and that the agreement was not
capable of being mass marketed.51 Marine Bank leaves open the dis-
tinct possibility that certain LLC interests may satisfy the Howey
test, yet not be investment contracts due to their uniquely private na-
ture. Indeed, a few lower courts have applied Marine Bank's ration-
ale in other novel contexts to preclude securities law coverage.5 2
The fact of the matter, however, is that relatively few LLCs will be
46. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 2.12 (Vernon 1992).
47. See discussion supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
48. Cf. L & B Hosp. Ventures, Inc. v. Healthcare Int'l, Inc., 894 F.2d 150, 152 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 55 (1990); discussion supra notes 29-35 and accompanying
text.
By analogy, the Fifth Circuit in Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1986),
compared a limited partner's position to that of a stockholder in a corporation. The
court pointed out that limited partners cannot dissolve the partnership, bind other
partners, or actively participate in the managerial functions of the partnership. More-
over, their liability is of a limited nature. Thus, the court held that the limited part-
nership constituted a security. Similarly, in Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1984),
the court noted that limited partners represent the type of investors that the securities
laws should protect. The court recognized that most limited partners simply invest
their money and rely on the skills and knowledge of the general partners to generate
profits.
49. 455 U.S. 551. (1982).
50. Id. at 559-60.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Mace Neufeld Productions, Inc. v. Orion Pictures Corp., 860 F.2d 944,
946-47 (9th Cir. 1988); Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Assoc. v. Hotel Ritten-
house Assoc., 595 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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subject to the Marine Bank analysis. For the most part, LLC inter-
ests are not such unique investments so as to prevent them from be-
ing offered on a mass scale. In other words, even if interests in a
particular LLC are in fact privately negotiated, the key criterion is
whether such interests are capable of mass distribution or public
trading.53 In this respect, LLC interests are quite similar to limited
partnership interests which normally are classified as investment
contracts.5 4 Hence, while LLC interests may be of a relatively recent
vintage, they generally are not of the unique nature required to come
within the Marine Bank analysis. Therefore, unless the particular
LLC interests possess unique characteristics that are especially tai-
lored to the participants involved,5 5 thereby rendering such interests
incapable of being mass marketed, Howey, rather than Marine Bank,
should control.5 6
F. Summation
It appears that the LLC agreement (as well as other pertinent op-
erating documents) frequently will be crucial. Based on the general
53. Cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S.Ct. 945, 951-52 (1990); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 644 (1943).
Interpreting Howey in view of Marine Bank, one court opined that an investment
contract "means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person (1) invests his
money (2) in a common enterprise and (3) is led to expect profits (4) solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party, and (5) risks loss." Dooner v. NMI Limited,
725 F. Supp. 153, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), citing, Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 1985). On the other
hand, this author has concluded that
an instrument will not be deemed an investment contract, irrespective of the
Howey test, if: (1) the transaction involves a novel or unique instrument (2)
which is not capable of mass distribution or public trading (3) where no pro-
spectus has been distributed and (4) the transaction is negotiated privately in-
volving few individuals.
STEINBERG, supra note 14, § 4A.04[2] (emphasis in original). Under the foregoing
interpretation,
all of the conditions enumerated must exist for the transaction to be declared
outside the scope of the federal securities laws under Weaver. If any condi-
tion is not present, then the proper analysis for determining the existence of
an investment contract normally is the Howey test. Even where the Howey
test is met, however, if there exists an alternative regulatory scheme that sig-
nificantly reduces the instrument's risk of loss, a court may well hold that the
instrument is not a security. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 100 S.Ct. 945 (1990).
Id. at 4A-51 n.37 (emphasis in original). Note that LLC interests are not subject to an
alternative regulatory framework that significantly reduces the investor's risk of loss.
See inkfra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
54. See discussion supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
55. For example, in Marine Bank, there were a number of novel provisions, in-
cluding that the lender was entitled to use the borrower's barn and pasture. 455 U.S.
at 553. In the LLC context, the alleged uniqueness of the arrangement may be evi-
denced by the applicable operating documents.
56. See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Def-
inition of "Security": The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis and
Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REv. 489, 518-25 (1987).
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partnership analogy, a court's determination whether a LLC interest
will be characterized as an investment contract often may depend on
the LLC agreement (and other applicable operating documents). If
the LLC agreement retains real power in the LLC members, then
LLC interests generally are not investment contracts. This outcome
may be reached regardless of the control actually exercised by the
LLC participants, so long as such participants are capable of mean-
ingfully exercising their powers.5 7 Hence, where the LLC agreement
allocates specifically clear powers to the members to provide them
with access to relevant informatibn and with the means to protect
their investments, the presumption arises that such LLC interests
are not investment contracts unless such presumption is overcome by
evidence that the LLC members "were rendered passive investors be-t
cause they were somehow precluded from exercising their powers of
control and supervision."58 On the other hand, when the LLC oper-
ating documents allocate power similar to that structured in a limited
partnership, then the presumption arises that the subject LLC mem-
bers may invoke the securities laws. Applying the economic reality
test, this presumption may be rebutted by a showing that such LLC
participants, through their actions outside of such documents, exer-
cised essential managerial efforts.59
57. Cf. Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.
1990).
58. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F. 2d 236, 239-42
(4th Cir. 1988) (ascertaining whether general partnership interest is a security).
59. Cf. L & B Hospital Ventures, Inc. v. Healthcare International, Inc. 894 F.2d
150, 152-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 55 (1990).
Note that a number of states employ the risk capital test to determine whether an
instrument is an investment contract. As Professor Sargent points out, there is no sin-
gle risk capital test. See Sargent, supra note 7, at 1092-95. For various formulations,
see, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961); State Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52
Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-5-2(16) (1981); Okla. Stat. tit. 71,
§ 2(20)(P) (1981) (containing an expensive risk capital test, defined as an "investment
of money or money's worth including goods furnished and/or services performed in
the risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where
the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decisions of the ven-
ture"). By eliminating the horizontal commonality requirement (if not the common
enterprise requirement altogether), greatly relaxing the "efforts of others" criterion,
and not imposing a common trading capability requirement, it is possible that certain
LLC interests, while not within the scope of the federal securities laws, may be invest-
ment contracts under the applicable state blue sky laws. See generally William J. Car-
ney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk
Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L. J. 73, 111-13 (1981).
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II. SAME OR SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS TEST
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,o the United States Supreme
Court adhered to what may be coined as the same or similar charac-
teristics test in analyzing whether an instrument had the qualities of
stock and, therefore, should qualify as a security.61 The Court noted
that the instrument's label does not conclusively render it a secur-
ity.62 Rather, if the instrument bears the label "stock" and has the
characteristics normally associated with stock, then the securities
laws will apply.6 3 The Court looked to the following attributes of
common stock to determine whether a security existed: (1) right to
receive profits based on the apportionment of one's interest in the
entity; (2) ability to vote in proportion to the interest owned; (3) ne-
gotiability of the investment; (4) ability to pledge the interest; and (5)
ability for the interest to appreciate in value.64
It should be recognized that in Landreth, as in other Supreme
Court decisions,65 the interest in question was labeled stock whereas
no such term is given to LLC interests. Nonetheless, because LLC
interests are issued by an entity called a "Company" and the typical
issuance of an equity interest by a commercial enterprise calling it-
self a company or corporation is stock, substance should prevail over
form, thereby mandating that LLC interests be analyzed pursuant to
the ordinary attributes of stock standard. The satisfaction of this
standard in the LLC setting comports with the Supreme Court's ac-
knowledgment in such contexts that individuals, "both trained and
untrained in business matters [are] likely [to] have a high expectation
that their activities are governed by the [Securities] Acts."6 6 Hence,
if LLC interests satisfy the five-factor analysis set forth above,6 7 then
such interests should be deemed securities.68
Applying the first factor of the attributes of stock test, the LLC
statutes generally provide for the distribution of profits to the mem-
60. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). See Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
61. 471 U.S. at 686.
62. Id.
63. Id. Accord, Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985). Compare United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975).
64. 471 U.S. at 686, relying on United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 851 (1975). In an accompanying footnote, the Landreth Court pointed out:
"[W]e wish to make clear that these characteristics are those usually associated with
common stock, the kind of stock often at issue in cases involving the sale of a business.
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and still be covered
by the Acts." 471 U.S. at 686 n.2.
65. See Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
66. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 693.
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
68. Furthermore, the fulfillment of these attributes lends support to the view that
an interest in a LLC is "commonly known as a security." See infra notes 87-107 and
accompanying text.
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bers of the enterprise based on their contribution of capital. Gener-
ally, some statutes state that, absent provision in the operating
agreement, a LLC should divide profits or gains according to an in-
vestor's contribution to the capital or operating value of the enter-
prise.69 Other statutes simply provide that the operating agreement
will govern the distribution of profits, but allow any investor to de-
mand cash in return for his or her contribution to the capital of the
company.7 0
Second, most LLC statutes do not explicitly outline the voting
rights of those participating in the enterprise. Most, however, set
forth that, unless the LLC operating documents provide otherwise,
the management of the LLC is vested in the members of the com-
pany, and that managerial rights are determined in proportion to the
members' contribution of capital.71 Implicit in this framework is the
notion that a member's ability to exercise managerial input for the
LLC depends significantly on the amount of capital invested in the
enterprise, much like in the corporate setting. The Colorado statute
explicitly states that the right to vote is divided on a per capita ba-
sis.72 The Texas statute allows for the formulation of voting rights in
any manner consistent with the regulations.73 Only the Kansas stat-
ute states that each member of the LLC has only one vote.7 4
Third, the LLC statutes allow all members to transfer or assign
their interests in the LLC. The statutes limit the free transferability
of such interests, however, by requiring either a unanimous written
consent of all members, 75 a unanimous consent with no writing
69. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7615 (Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
5.03 (Vernon Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-130 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1029 (Michie Supp. 1991). The Nevada and Colorado statutes specifically define
membership interest as "a member's share of the profits and losses of a limited liabil-
ity company and the right to receive distributions of [the] company's assets." COL.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(10) (West Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV. STAT. § 86.091 (1991).
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.426, 608.427(3) (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-
119, 17-15-12 0(c) (1977).
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1992); NEVADA REV. STAT. § 86-3.291
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125(1) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022(B)
(Michie Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977).
72. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-706(1) (West Supp. 1991).
73. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1568n, 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1991).
75. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-702(1) (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.432 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV.
STAT. § 86.351(1) (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1528n, arts. 4.01(B)(1), 4.05(1)-(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
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requirement,7 6 or a majority consent 77 of all nontransferring mem-
bers before allowing the assignee to participate as a member of the
LLC. This limitation on the transferability of LLC interests should
not present a block to defining such interests as securities, however,
when analogized to the close corporation context.
In corporations composed of few shareholders, those who own the
business frequently desire significant income from employment with
or dividends declared by the entity.7 8 The nature of the relationships
between the various stockholders may give rise to heightened fiduci-
ary duties, thereby likening a close corporation to an incorporated
partnership.79 The importance of delectus personae to the individual
participants frequently results in the execution of stock transfer re-
strictions, including right of first refusal, first option, and buy-sell
provisions.80 Any such provision generally will be upheld if it is not
perceived as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.81 Similarly,
stock transfer restrictions are authorized by close corporation stat-
utes enacted by several states.8 2 A number of these statutes adhere
to the principle that stock issued by such entities is not freely trans-
ferable and only allow such transfer pursuant to specified excep-
tions.8 3  Moreover, certain close corporation statutes allow
shareholders to transfer their interests to third parties, but restrict
the right of any such transferee to participate in the management or
administration of the close corporation during the term of the share-
holder agreement unless the shareholders agree otherwise.8 4 Hence,
even though limitations frequently exist on an investor's ability to
76. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1039, 13.1-1040(A) (Michie Supp. 1991).
77. UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2b-131(1) (Supp. 1991).
78. See F. HODGE O'NEAL AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1987).
79. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d
657 (1976); Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.J.2d 799, 473 N.E.2d
1173 (1984); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554,
aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1979).
80. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 18.2 (1986).
81. See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 141
N.E.2d 812 (1957); LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ, AND JEFFREY D.
BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 396 (2d ed. 1988) ("The general American
rule has been that unreasonable restraints on the alienation of personal property are
void.").
82. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 418 (1990); DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 342(a)(2) (1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-72022 (1988); MD. CLOSE CORP. L. §§ 4-401(a)(2), 4-503(b) (1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78A.050 (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:7-12 (19 -); WISC. STAT.
§ 180.1805(3) (1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-17-111 (1989); discussion in O'NEAL & THOMPSON
supra note 78, at § 7.07.
83. See authorities cited supra note 82.
84. See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 12.32(A)(4) 12.36(B), 12.37(D) (Vernon
Supp. 1992) (depending on the agreement, shareholders may modify the transferability
restriction by majority vote of all outstanding shares, consent of all shareholders, or
written consent of all shareholders). See also MD. CLOSE CORP. L. §§ 4-401(a)(1), (4), 4-
504(a) (1985).
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transfer stock in a closely-held corporation, these instruments gener-
ally come within the purview of the securities laws. Similarly,
although the LLC structure places certain restrictions on transfera-
bility of interests, such restrictions normally should not bar LLC in-
terests from satisfying this element.
Fourth, an individual's interest in the LLC is his or her personal
property.8 5 Such personal property may be pledged by the individual
in order to obtain loans, financing, or to conduct further business
transactions. Finally, LLC interests may increase in value by, for ex-
ample, the applicable LLC earning profits and the reinvesting of such
profits, resulting in the LLC's capital appreciation.8 6
In sum, an investor's interest in a LLC ordinarily possesses charac-
teristics similar to those associated with stock. Accordingly, courts
normally should apply the securities laws to the transaction in reli-
ance on the foregoing five-factor analysis. It must be remembered,
however, that the operating agreements or articles of organization al-
low the LLC members to adjust the statutory requirements to fit the
specific needs of the enterprise. Thus, when evaluating LLC inter-
ests, one should look to such documents to help determine whether
the five-factor analysis is satisfied.
III. LLC INTERESTS UNDER THE DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide definitions for the term "se-
curity."8 7 The United States Supreme Court has consistently recog-
85. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-702 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 608.431 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7617 (Supp. 1991); NEVADA REV.
STAT. §§ 86.351 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 4.04 (Vernon Supp. 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-103 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1038 (Michie Supp.
1991); WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-122 (1977).
86. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-104(g) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.404(6) (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7604(f) (Supp. 1991); NEVADA
REV. STAT. 86.281(7) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-105(g) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-1009(6) (Michie Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-104(vii) (1977).
For lower court decisions analyzing the five-factor analysis, see, e.g., Seger v. Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha, 850 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying criteria,
lender's Class B "s;tock" did not have characteristics normally associated with such an
instrument and, hence, was not a security); One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848
F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (option to purchase stock deemed a security relying on Lan-
dreth); McVay v. Western Plains Service Corporation, 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987)
(interpreting Forman and Landreth, loan participation certificates held not to be
"stock" within scope of the securities laws because such certificates "lack[ed] any of
the basic attributes of true stock").
87. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988); Se-
curities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
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nized the parallel characteristics of the two definitions and analyzed
them as similar in their opinions.88 Instead of providing a broad defi-
nition or explanation of the term "security," both statutes list various
interests, such as notes, stocks, bonds, and investment contracts,
among numerous other categories, as securities. The definition of a
security is not limited to the laundry list provided in the statutes. In
addition, "any interest or instrument commonly known as a security"
falls within the purview of the security definition.89
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,9 0 as well as subse-
quent decisions, 91 the Supreme Court recognized that an investor's
perception of his or her interest provides some guidance as to
whether the particular instrument falls within the statutory defini-
tion.9 2 In this regard, the Forman Court realized that the name at-
tached to the instrument has some relevance to whether such
instrument is deemed a security, if it induced the investor to engage
in the purchase.9 3 While the Court focused on the terms stocks and
bonds as traditional names identified with a security, it also acknowl-
edged that if an instrument contains significant characteristics typi-
cally associated with a security, this can also support the view that
the interest is commonly known as a security.9 4 Applied to the LLC
context, an investor's justifiable perception when purchasing equity
interests in an enterprise called a "company" is that such interests
are covered by the securities laws. This common understanding, es-
pecially when combined with the realization that LLC interests pos-
sess characteristics which are typically associated with stock, should
result in classifying this instrument as a security.
The Supreme Court's "family resemblance" test enunciated in
88. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975)
("The definition[s] [are] virtually identical and for present purposes, the coverage of
the two Acts may be considered the same."); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967).
89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988); Se-
curities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7Mb(1) (1988). Note that the definition of secur-
ity is prefaced by the language "unless the content otherwise requires." The United
States Supreme Court addressed this phrase in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551
(1982), discussed in Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 56, at 498-519.
In SEC v. CM. Joiner Leasing Corp, 320 U.S. 344 (1943), the United States Supreme
Court supported a liberal construction of the "security" definition, stating "uncom-
mon... devices ... are also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were
widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their
character in commerce as... 'any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'secur-
ity'." Id. at 351.
90. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
91. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); Lamberth Timber Company v. Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
92. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 693; Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-50.
93. 421 U.S. at 848-50.
94. Id. at 851.
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Reves v. Ernest & Young 95 provides guidance in this area. In Reves,
the Court analyzed whether a note constitutes a security by listing
four factors that comprise the family resemblance test.96 Signifi-
cantly, the Re-ves Court opined that these four factors are the ones
that it has looked to "in deciding whether a transaction involves a 'se-
curity'." 9 7 Hence, the family resemblance test apparently has wide-
spread application, encompassing the determination whether LLC
interests are securities.98
Applying the family resemblance test, one first examines the moti-
vations that would prompt a reasonable buyer and seller to engage in
the transaction. If the seller is interested in raising funds for the
general use of the business or to finance expansion and the purchaser
is primarily interested in the profits expected to be generated, it is
likely that such instruments are securities. 99 Ordinarily, these moti-
vations exist in the LLC context.10 0
Second, one must assess the plan of distribution to determine
whether the instruments may be commonly traded. So long as the
LLC interests are capable of mass distribution or public trading, this
factor should be deemed satisfied, even if there were in fact few of-
ferees or purchasers.1o1 This interpretation of Reves comports with
the Court's prior statements on this issue.10 2 The third factor ana-
lyzes the reasonable expectations of the investing public. According
to Reves, "[t]he Court will consider instruments to be 'securities' on
the basis of such public expectations, even where an economic analy-
sis of the circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest
95. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
96. Id. at 951-52.
97. Id. at 951.
98. See Marc I. Steinberg, Notes as Securities: Reves and Its Implications, 51 OHIo
ST. L.J. 675, 679 (1,990) ("[If any applicable standard has widespread application in the
definition of 'security' setting, it is the 'family resemblance' test.").
99. See 110 S. Ct. at 951-52.
100. From the investor's point of view, such a result is due to the prospect of capital
appreciation, participation in earnings, and tax benefits.
101. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
102. Hence, the Court's language in Reves that there be common trading so that the
instruments are "offered and sold to a broad segment of the public" (110 S. Ct. at 952)
should be read in light of the Court's previous decisions. See, e.g., Landreth, 471 U.S.
at 687, 693 (1985) (stock of closely held corporation not traded on any exchange held to
be a "security"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337 (1967) (nonnegotiable but
transferable "withdrawable capital shares" in savings and loan association held to be a
"security"); Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1946) (units of citrus grove and maintenance con-
tract held to be "securities" although not traded on exchange). Even though the Court
did not refer to the "capability" of mass distribution, the cases relied on by the Court
support this proposition.
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that the instruments are not 'securities' as used in that transac-
tion."' 03 As discussed above, both sophisticated and uninitiated in-
vestors may justifiably view the term "company" when purchasing
LLC interests as giving rise to securities law coverage. 04
The last factor of the family resemblance text is whether there ex-
ists another regulatory framework that significantly lessens the in-
vestment's risk, thereby rendering application of the securities laws
unnecessary. 05 Other than the federal and state securities laws,106
there is no regulatory framework that greatly reduces such risk.
This is especially relevant since the LLC is a new and relatively
uninterpreted business structure, which needs sufficient safeguards
in order to encourage investors to utilize this form. Hence, given that
LLC interests generally satisfy the family resemblance test and are
justifiably perceived as securities, these interests should be deemed to
be within the purview of the securities laws.107
IV. CONCLUSION
While each LLC interest must be analyzed by looking at the appli-
cable statutes as well as the specific provisions contained in the mem-
ber agreement and other operating documents, this article takes the
position that LLC interests normally are securities. Three different
methods of analysis lead to this result. First, one may look at the
traditional "investment contract" test and find that LLC interests
satisfy the Howey test, especially in light of the Williamson ration-
ale. Second, LLC interests meet the attributes of stock test as set
forth by the Supreme Court. Finally, one can classify an interest in a
LLC as "any interest commonly known as a security."
103. 110 S. Ct. at 952.
104. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
105. 110 S, Ct. at 952. Although subject to criticism, the functional regulation factor
set forth in Reves is consistent with the Marine Bank analysis. See Marine Bank, 455
U.S. at 559; Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70 (dicta). For criticism of the functional regulation
analysis, see Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 56, at 504-18.
106. Of course, the state blue sky statutes and actions for common law fraud are
designed to supplement, not usurp, the federal securities laws.
107. See Steinberg, supra note 98, at 678-81. For additional commentary on Reves
and its implications, see James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Prom-
issory Notes as Securities, 69 TEx. L. REV. 383 (1990); Janet E. Kerr and Karen M. Ei-
senhauer, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1123 (1992).
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